When "It" becomes "Mine": attentional biases triggered by object ownership. by Turk, David J et al.
                          Turk, D. J., van Bussel, K., Brebner, J., Toma, A., Krigolson, O., & Handy,
T. (2011). When "It" becomes "Mine": attentional biases triggered by object
ownership.Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(12), 3725-3733.
10.1162/jocn_a_00101
Link to published version (if available):
10.1162/jocn_a_00101
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms.html
Take down policy
Explore Bristol Research is a digital archive and the intention is that deposited content should not be
removed. However, if you believe that this version of the work breaches copyright law please contact
open-access@bristol.ac.uk and include the following information in your message:
• Your contact details
• Bibliographic details for the item, including a URL
• An outline of the nature of the complaint
On receipt of your message the Open Access Team will immediately investigate your claim, make an
initial judgement of the validity of the claim and, where appropriate, withdraw the item in question
from public view.
When “It” Becomes “Mine”: Attentional Biases Triggered by
Object Ownership
David J. Turk1, Kim van Bussel1, Joanne L. Brebner1,
Andreea S. Toma2, Olav Krigolson3, and Todd C. Handy2
Abstract
■ Previous research has demonstrated that higher-order cog-
nitive processes associated with the allocation of selective atten-
tion are engaged when highly familiar self-relevant items are
encountered, such as oneʼs name, face, personal possessions
and the like. The goal of our study was to determine whether
these effects on attentional processing are triggered on-line at
the moment self-relevance is established. In a pair of experi-
ments, we recorded ERPs as participants viewed common ob-
jects (e.g., apple, socks, and ketchup) in the context of an
“ownership” paradigm, where the presentation of each object
was followed by a cue indicating whether the object nominally
belonged either to the participant (a “self” cue) or the experi-
menter (an “other” cue). In Experiment 1, we found that “self”
ownership cues were associated with increased attentional pro-
cessing, as measured via the P300 component. In Experiment 2,
we replicated this effect while demonstrating that at a visual–
perceptual level, spatial attention became more narrowly fo-
cused on objects owned by self, as measured via the lateral
occipital P1 ERP component. Taken together, our findings indi-
cate that self-relevant attention effects are triggered by the act
of taking ownership of objects associated with both perceptual
and postperceptual processing in cortex. ■
INTRODUCTION
Taking ownership of objects is a ubiquitous experience in
everyday life. Whether we are purchasing a new pair of
shoes or simply grabbing something to eat, we are con-
stantly changing our psychological relationship with ob-
jects by the act of taking personal possession. It is thus
somewhat surprising that little is known about the cog-
nitive underpinnings of subsuming ownership—in es-
sence, what happens when a pair of Nikes or a banana
becomes my pair of Nikes or my banana? Here we ex-
amine this issue from the perspective of self-relevant in-
formation processing, and in particular, we ask whether
attentional effects associated with self-relevant stimuli are
triggered or initiated at the moment we take ownership
of an object.
In this regard, it has long been appreciated that we
parse or sort incoming information from the external
environment on the basis of current goal states, past ex-
perience, or personal values—that is, on the basis of its
relevance to self (e.g., Conway&Dewhurst, 1995; Postman,
Bruner, & McGinnies, 1948). For example, in dichotic lis-
tening studies that present different messages to each
ear but require attention to only one channel, information
presented to the unattended ear is more likely to penetrate
conscious awareness when it contains self-relevant infor-
mation (e.g., the participantʼs name or words consistent
with the participantʼs self-concept), relative to similar ma-
terial not related to self (e.g., Bargh, 1982; Moray, 1959).
Likewise, Tong and Nakayama (1999) showed that partici-
pants were faster to detect the presence of their own face
among a set of distracter faces than they were to detect
the presence of a familiar face. At the same time, the pro-
cessing benefits afforded to self-relevant information is not
limited to the perceptual domain, as memory for task ma-
terials is also greater for items related to the self (Van den
Bos, Cunningham, Conway, & Turk, 2010; Cunningham,
Turk, Macdonald, & Macrae, 2008; Turk, Cunningham, &
Macrae, 2008; Symons & Johnson, 1997; Rogers, Kuiper,
& Kirker, 1977). Such evidence has suggested that not only
do we pay greater attention to self-relevant information,
but that we do this automatically (e.g., Bargh & Pratto,
1986; Bargh, 1982; Moray, 1959; Cherry, 1953).
In a direct test of this hypothesis, Gray and colleagues
recently asked participants to view words on a computer
screen while they recorded the participantsʼ brain electrical
responses via ERPs (Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin,
2004). The words themselves were things like names and
places and came from two different categories presented
with equal probability: words directly relevant to the par-
ticipant (e.g., the participantʼs name and hometown) and
words not directly relevant to the participant. What they
found in the ERP data was that, whereas self-relevant words
generated a P300 component, words from the non-self-
relevant category did not. Given that P300s can be gener-
ated to stimuli with personal “emotional value” regardless
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of their contextual probability and task relevance (e.g.,
Johnston, Miller, & Burleson, 2004), Gray et al. (2004) con-
cluded that we do in fact devote greater attentional re-
sources to self-relevant information (see also Ninomiya,
Onitsuka, Chen, Sato, & Tashiro, 1998; Berlad & Pratt,
1995; Fischler, Jin, Boaz, Perry, & Childers, 1987).
In light of the findings by Gray et al. (2004), the goal
of the current study was to determine whether this en-
hanced attentional processing of self-relevant stimuli is
initiated by the act of taking ownership of an object. In
essence, when something becomes ours, does this alter
how we attend to it? The question is of importance be-
cause, unlike things such as our name and hometown
(e.g., Gray et al., 2004) or objects we already own (e.g.,
Miyakoshi, Nomura, & Ohira, 2007), it remains unclear
whether the attentional benefits afforded to self-relevant
items can be dynamically ascribed in real-time to arbitrary
objects with which we have no prior personal history.
To address this issue, we utilized a modified version of
the “shopping” paradigm employed by Cunningham et al.
(2008). On a computer screen, participants viewed highly
familiar items found in major supermarkets (e.g., fruit
and toiletries) one at a time, each presented centrally
and with a square black border around the object image.
Shortly after the presentation of the item, the border
around the object changed in color to either red or
blue. The color change served as a cue to object own-
ership, such that one color signaled the object was now
the participantʼs, whereas the other color signaled that
the object was now the experimenterʼs. The mapping
of color to ownership condition (“self” vs. “other”) was
counterbalanced between participants and an equal num-
ber of objects were assigned to the two ownership con-
ditions. Following the ownership cue, the participantsʼ
task was to simply indicate with a manual two-choice
response whether the given object was his or hers verus
the experimentersʼ.
Our primary dependent measure was the P300 elicited
by the ownership cue, as a function of whether the cue
was for “self” versus “other.” Specifically, we expected a
P300 to be generated in both cue conditions, because
the cues were targets requiring responses (e.g., Donchin
& Coles, 1988). However, if the attentional benefits of
self-relevant processing are in fact triggered at the moment
when ownership of an object is taken, then it is predicted
that the P300 elicited by “self” cues should be larger in




Fifteen healthy undergraduate students (10 women, mean
age = 20 years 1 month) participated in this study for
course credit. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision
and no reported neurological abnormalities. All testing
procedures were approved by the University of Aberdeen
Psychology Ethics Committee.
Stimuli
The stimulus set comprised a total of 144 digital images
of items sold in major supermarkets, generated from in-
ternet search engines (e.g., apple, socks, and camera).
These images were divided into two equal sets matched
on category membership (e.g., fruit, clothing, and elec-
trical items) and on name length. The images were edited
so that each item was placed on a white background and
resized to 250 × 250 pixels at a resolution of 72 dpi. A
border 25 pixels wide was then drawn around the image
giving a total display size of 300 × 300 pixels. This border
was generated in three color hues (black, red, and blue).
During the experiment, the same image was presented
twice within each trial, once with a black border and a
second time with a colored border. This border color was
used to denote item ownership. Stimuli were presented on
a VGA monitor controlled by a Pentium PC using presen-
tation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA).
Procedure
Participants were seated 57 cm from the computer screen.
Each study began with the onscreen presentation of an
image of a red and a blue basket in the top right and top
left corner of the screen. These remained on the screen
throughout the experiment. Participants were instructed
that they were undertaking a sorting task, and that they
were to place items into the correct basket denoted by
the border color using a button press. Response buttons
were spatially aligned with the presented basket images
so that pressing a button on the left would indicate plac-
ing the item in the blue (left) basket. Participants were
also informed that they owned the contents of one of their
basket and that the experimenter owned the contents of
the other basket. The assignment of baskets and items to
owners was counterbalanced across participants in this
study. Previous research has shown that basket location
or color assignment had no effect on cognitive processing
in an ownership task (Cunningham et al., 2008). Given
this finding and our counterbalanced procedure, any differ-
ences in ERPs to targets should be because of task-related
processes (i.e., ownership) rather than stimulus properties
(i.e., location of basket, color of basket, or object effects).
During this sorting phase, participants were presented
with an image of an item found in most major supermarkets
(e.g., a pair of socks). This was presented in the center of
the computer screen for a variable interval between 400
and 600 msec. The same image was then presented with
a colored border for a variable interval between 800 and
1400 msec (giving the appearance of a border change)
during which the behavioral response was made. A variable
inter-trial interval of between 2400 and 2600 msec during
which only the basket imageswere presented then followed.
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All events of interest were presented in one continuous
recording sequence.
Electrophysiological Recording
Scalp potentials were recorded from 64 Ag–AgCl active
electrodes via a Biosemi Active Two ERP system. Continu-
ous EEG was sampled at 512 Hz. Vertical and horizontal
eye movements were recorded using four additional
electrodes placed on the outer canthus of each eye and
one above and one below the right eye. Two additional
electrodes were used to record from the left and right
mastoids. All recorded voltages were made relative to a
common mode voltage based on the Active Twoʼs CMS/
DRL feedback loop. EEG analysis was performed using
EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004; www.sccn.ucsd.edu/
eeglab) running under Matlab 7.7 (The Mathworks, Cam-
bridge, MA). Off-line, all scalp electrodes were referenced
to the average of the left and right mastoid signals and fil-
tered with a bandpass of 0.1–30 Hz. Automated artifact re-
jection was then used to eliminate trials with detectable eye
movements, blinks, muscle potentials or amplifier block-
ing. The criteria used to reject a segment included a change
between adjacent sampling pointst of ±20 μV and a change
of more than 150 μV across the entire segment. Across
participants, no more than approximately 10% of trials
were rejected on the basis of these artifacts. For each
participant, EEG time-locked to the remaining events of
interest was epoched into 700-msec segments, begin-
ning 200 msec before stimulus onset until 500 msec post-
stimulus. These epochs were then signal-averaged within
each condition, digitally low-pass filtered (25.6 Hz half-
amplitude cutoff ) and baseline corrected to remove any
linear slow-wave drifts. These single-subject waveforms
were then used to generate the group-averaged waveforms
for display and analysis. A −200 to 0 msec prestimulus




Because of some technical issues, response data were
absent for 4 of the 15 participants. Analysis of response
accuracy during the sorting phase showed that the re-
maining 11 subjects made small numbers of errors (self,
2.7%; other, 2.8%) in each of the encoding conditions.
We also examined response latency in these same 11
participants during the sorting phase. Median RTs (self,
442 msec; other, 449 msec) did not differ across ownership
conditions [t(10) = −0.509, p > .6].
ERPs
The P300 ERP component can be seen in Figure 1 as a
function of cue condition. To identify whether the P300
amplitude varied between cue conditions, we conducted
an omnibus repeated measures ANOVA that included a
factor of Cue Condition (self vs. other). Consistent with
the findings of Gray et al. (2004) and the P300 in general
(e.g., Donchin & Coles, 1988), the P300 was maximal
over the midline central and parietal electrode sites; our
ANOVA thus also included nine total electrodes via factors
of Scalp Electrode Scalp Location (C1/CZ/C2 vs. CP1/CPZ/
CP2 vs. P1/PZ/P2) and Hemisphere of Electrode (left vs.
midline vs. right). As reported in Table 1, mean amplitude
measures were taken at each electrode over a 100-msec
time window centered on the approximate P300 peak
in the grand averaged waveforms (310–410 msec post-
stimulus). We found a significant main effect of Cue Con-
dition [F(1, 14) = 6.18, p < .05, partial eta = 0.306], such
that the P300 amplitude was larger for self versus other
cues (means: self, 10.51 μV; other, 9.18 μV). This effect of
Cue Condition did not interact with Scalp Location [F(2,
13) = 1.69, p > .22] or with Hemisphere of Electrode [F(2,
13) = 0.86, p > .44].
Discussion
Our findings thus indicate that the P300 elicited by
the ownership cues was larger for “self” versus “other”
cues. This suggests that the attentional benefits afforded
to self-relevant stimuli as measured via the P300 (e.g.,
Miyakoshi et al., 2007; Gray et al., 2004) can be triggered
on-line and at the moment ownership of an object is taken.
Moreover, it would appear that these effects could be as-
cribed to objects that we have no specific personal history
with. Rather, the mere act of taking ownership of an object
seems to be sufficient for activating self-relevant informa-
tion processing.
Given this preliminary conclusion, we thus wanted to
conduct a second experiment with two specific goals. First,
could we replicate our finding from Experiment 1? If so,
this would provide strong evidence that our initial results
were in fact valid and reliable. Although the data from Ex-
periment 1 aligns with the findings of Gray et al. (2004) that
self-relevant information processing can bias higher-level,
postperceptual aspects of attention-related processes,
what about more perceptual or sensory-based aspects of
attention? The second goal of Experiment 2 was, therefore,
to explore whether taking ownership of an object could
affect how we attend to it at a visual–perceptual level as
well.
EXPERIMENT 2
Visual attention has a remarkable capacity for modulating
the intensity of stimulus-evoked activity in visual cortex.
For example, when we increase the amount of attention
we pay to an object weʼre looking at, there are concomi-
tant decreases in the intensity of sensory-evoked activity
for stimuli presented in our visual periphery as measured
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via the occipital P1 ERP component (e.g., Handy, Soltani,
& Mangun, 2001). These effects of attention on visual
processing occur in retinotopically mapped regions of
visual cortex (e.g., Woldorff et al., 1997; Heinze et al.,
1994) and reflect attentional consequences for informa-
tion processing that are distinct from those captured in
the P300 (e.g., Donchin & Coles, 1988; Coles & Rugg,
1995). The goal of Experiment 2 was, thus, to replicate
our findings from Experiment 1 while determining
whether the act of taking ownership of an object can
affect attention at the visual perceptual level as well.
Accordingly, we adapted our paradigm from Experi-
ment 1 to include a small task-irrelevant visual “probe”
(or square-wave grating) that was briefly presented twice
during each trial sequence several degrees of visual an-
gle above the shopping object, centered on the vertical
meridian (1) after the onset of the shopping object but
before the ownership cue and (2) following the owner-
ship cue. We could then compare the amplitude of the
occipital P1 ERP component elicited by this probe, as a
function of pre- versus postownership cue and whether
the cue was for self versus other. If cues to ownership
trigger a greater allocation of visual–perceptual attention
to objects we are given (vs. objects given to someone
else), the P1 elicited by this visual probe should be re-
duced specifically when following a self cue.
Table 1. Experiment 1: Mean Amplitudes (μV) and in P300
Time Frame at Selected Electrode Sites
Electrode Self SE Other SE
C1 10.85 0.73 9.27 0.82
C2 11.24 0.88 9.91 0.77
Cz 12.02 0.77 10.07 0.78
CP1 10.51 0.74 9.30 0.79
CP2 10.71 0.90 9.54 0.73
CPz 11.69 0.76 10.46 0.74
P1 9.44 0.76 8.07 0.75
P2 9.05 0.80 8.01 0.73
Pz 10.17 0.78 8.94 0.80
Figure 1. ERP responses to ownership cues, Experiment 1.
3728 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 23, Number 12
Methods
Participants
Twenty-four healthy undergraduate students (20 women,
mean age = 20 years 3 months) participated in this study
for course credit. All had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and no reported neurological abnormalities. All
testing procedures were approved by the University of
Aberdeen Psychology Ethics Committee.
Stimuli
All stimuli were identical to Experiment 1, with the fol-
lowing exceptions. First, the colored baskets were no
longer presented. Second, the image set was reduced to
140 items. Third, square wave gratings were generated
in which alternating vertical bands of black and white of
equal width were presented in a 50× 50 pixel space. These
were presented along the vertical meridian in parafoveal
perceptual space.
Procedure
The instructions for this experiment were identical to
those for Experiment 1, with the exception that par-
ticipants were instructed to ignore the presence of task-
irrelevant gratings presented during the encoding phase.
In addition, there were subtle differences in the presenta-
tion parameters utilized during this phase of the study to
accommodate the presentation of these gratings. As in
Experiment 1, participants were presented with an image
of an item found in most major supermarkets (e.g., a pair
of socks). This was presented in the center of the computer
screen for a variable interval between 400 and 600 msec.
Following this, the first parafoveal grating was presented
along the vertical meridian for 100 msec before the initial
image was re-presented for another period of between
400 and 600 msec. The same image was then presented
with a colored border denoting item ownership for a vari-
able interval between 800 and 1200 msec (giving the
appearance of a border change), during which the behav-
ioral response was made. A second grating was presented
between 400 and 600 msec after the onset of this border
change, again for a period of 100 msec. A variable inter-trial
interval of between 2400 and 2600 msec during which a
blank screen was presented and then followed. All events
of interest were presented in one continuous recording
sequence. The presentation of peripheral gratings before
and after the presentation of ownership cues therefore
allowed us to measure electrophysiological responses pre-
and postownership.
Electrophysiological Recording
All recording and ERP analysis parameters were identical
to Experiment 1. Analysis was carried out using Brain
Vision Analyzer 2 software.
Results
Analysis of response accuracy during the sorting phase
showed that the subjects made small but equal numbers
of errors (self, 0.7%; other, 1.13%) across each of the
encoding conditions.
We also examined response latency during the sorting
phase. Median RTs (self, 496 msec; other, 518 msec) were
significantly different across the two ownership conditions
[t(23) = −2.609, p < .05], with shorter latency.
ERPs: P3
The P300 ERP component can be seen in Figure 2 as a
function of cue condition. To identify whether the P300
amplitude varied between cue conditions, we conducted
an omnibus repeated measures ANOVA that included a
factor of Cue Condition (self vs. other). We included six
electrodes via factors of scalp electrode Scalp Location
(CP1/CPZ/CP2 vs. P1/PZ/P2) and Hemisphere of Elec-
trode (left vs. midline vs. right). As reported in Table 2,
mean amplitude measures were taken at each electrode
over a 20-msec time window centered on the approxi-
mate P300 peak in the grand averaged waveforms (373–
393 msec poststimulus). We found a significant main effect
of Cue Condition [F(1, 23) = 8.28, p < .01, partial eta =
0.265], such that the P300 amplitude was larger for self
versus other cues (means: self, 4.81 μV; other, 3.73 μV).
This effect of Cue Condition did not interact with Scalp
Location [F(1, 23) = 3.61, p > .05] or with Hemisphere
of Electrode [F(2, 22) = 0.73, p > .49].
ERPs: P1
The P1 ERP component can be seen in Figure 3 as a func-
tion of cue condition. To identify whether the P1 ampli-
tude varied between cue conditions, we conducted an
omnibus repeated measures ANOVA that included a fac-
tor of Cue Condition (self vs. other vs. pre-owned). Con-
sistent with the literature, P1 was maximal over occipital
electrode sites (Mangun & Hillyard, 1991, 1995); our
ANOVA, thus, also included three total electrodes via
Hemisphere of Electrode (left vs. midline vs. right). As re-
ported in Table 3, mean amplitude measures were taken at
each electrode over a 10-msec time window centered on
the approximate P1 peak in the grand averaged waveforms
(125–135 msec poststimulus). We found a significant main
effect of Cue Condition [F(2, 22) = 5.57, p < .05, partial
eta = 0.336]. Subsequent means comparisons (least signif-
icant difference) on the main effect of Cue Condition dem-
onstrated that there was a significant decrease in P1 on
self cue trials relative to the pre-owned condition ( p <
.01) and that P1 amplitude for self-cued trials was signif-
icantly lower than for other cued trials ( p< .05). However,
there was no significant decrease in P1 for other cue trials
relative to pre-owned responses ( p= .26). This main effect
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of Cue Condition did not interact with Hemisphere of
Electrode [F(4, 20) = 0.76, p > .56].
Discussion
Experiment 2 was carried out in an attempt to replicate
the P300 effects observed in Experiment 1 and to explore
the impact on the detection of self-relevance on visual
attention to the owned object. As for the previous study,
we observed significant differences in the P300 compo-
nent as a function of ownership at centro-parietal and
parietal midline electrodes sites. This finding is in line
with previous ERP experiments exploring self-relevance
(Miyakoshi et al., 2007; Ninomiya et al., 1998; Berlad &
Pratt, 1995; Fischler et al., 1987).
In addition, we also observed changes in the visual
attention directed toward self-relevant objects. Our data
show significant decreases in the P1 component at occip-
ital electrode sites toward self-owned objects compared
with other-owned objects and in contrast to pre-owned
responses. This decrease in the P1 postownership is in-
terpreted as reflecting a narrowing of attention to owned
objects, and therefore, a reduction in the P1 capture
associated with irrelevant visual gratings presented in
the periphery (Handy et al., 2001). In essence, peripher-
ally presented task-irrelevant visual information received
greater processing in other-owned events, and this may
also explain the significant increase in response latency
observed on these trials.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our study was designed to ask whether attentional effects
associated with self-relevant stimuli are triggered when we
first take ownership of an object. The experiments them-
selves followed from prior work demonstrating that self-
relevant information, such as your name or the name of
your hometown, generate a greater degree of cognitive
analysis as measured via a P300 ERP response, relative to
information lacking in direct self-relevance (e.g., Miyakoshi
et al., 2007; Gray et al., 2004). In this regard, we had two
key findings. First, in Experiment 1, we found that “self”
ownership cues generated significantly larger P300s in
comparison with “other” ownership cues. Second, in Ex-
periment 2, we replicated this P300 effect while demon-
strating that, at a perceptual level, visual attention also
becomes more narrowly focused on objects we own—an
effect that emerges within a few hundred milliseconds of
taking object ownership.
The fact that “self” ownership cues in our paradigm
generated a larger P300 response relative to “other” cues
has several important implications. For one, given that
Table 2. Experiment 2: Mean Amplitudes (μV) in P300 Time
Frame at Selected Electrode Sites
Electrode Self SE Other SE
CP1 4.61 0.57 3.49 0.49
CP2 4.89 0.65 3.99 0.55
CPz 4.74 0.65 3.90 0.54
P1 4.72 0.64 3.49 0.47
P2 4.90 0.64 3.72 0.48
Pz 4.97 0.70 3.80 0.60
Figure 2. ERP responses to ownership cues, Experiment 2.
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P300s are generated to stimuli with personal “emotional
value” regardless of contextual probability and task rele-
vance (e.g., Johnston et al., 2004), it suggests that the
attentional benefits we naturally afford to self-relevant
items can be dynamically ascribed in real-time to objects
at the moment we take ownership. For another, that
these effects were found for arbitrary objects that partici-
pants had had no prior personal experience with indi-
cates that the cognitive processing benefits associated
with self-relevant information or stimuli do not depend
on familiarity with the given item or object. Rather, as
any parent of young children well knows, as soon as
something is considered “mine,” that appears to be suffi-
cient to alter our cognitive relationship to that object.
Notably, however, the attentional effects of taking ob-
ject ownership were not limited to the cognitive level. In
Experiment 2, when we examined the sensory-evoked
responses in visual cortex to task-irrelevant probes pre-
sented in the visual periphery both before and after own-
ership cues were given, the intensity of these responses
was specifically reduced for probes presented following a
“self” ownership cue. What does this suggest? When the
perceptual load of a task at fixation is increased, there is
a reduction in the amplitude of the lateral occipital P1
component elicited by task-irrelevant probes in the visual
periphery, an effect taken as ipso facto evidence that vi-
sual spatial attention has narrowed about fixation under
high-load conditions (e.g., Handy et al., 2001). Our P1 data
from Experiment 2 thus suggest that a similar perceptual-
level effect arises when we take ownership of an object-
when something becomes ours, not only do we afford it
a greater degree of cognitive processing but our visual
attention appears to automatically zoom in on that object
as well.
In light of these conclusions, it is also important to high-
light several control issues. For example, because the
materials employed in our study consisted of highly famil-
iar, common objects, it is unlikely that the reported P300
Table 3. Experiment 2: Mean Amplitudes (μV) in P1 Time
Frame at Selected Electrode Sites
Electrode Self SE Other SE Not Owned SE
O1 1.83 0.43 2.45 0.41 2.77 0.42
O2 1.75 0.49 2.47 0.41 3.00 0.42
Oz 1.74 0.51 2.47 0.42 2.75 0.53
Figure 3. ERP responses to
peripheral grating stimuli,
Experiment 2.
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effects are related to systematic differences in item famil-
iarity between conditions of interest. Nor are the effects
likely to be because of any inherent differences in the
physical or low-level image properties of the stimuli them-
selves, as the assignment of objects to “self” versus “other”
conditions was counterbalanced across participants. In-
stead, it appears that the differences in the P300 for “self”
versus “other” conditions was likely driven by the actual
encoding of cue self-relevance.
Likewise, one might argue that the reduction in P1 am-
plitude for the visual probes following “self” cues could
reflect cue-dependent shifts in more general attentional
states rather than a specific narrowing of visual spatial
attention. For instance, when we naturally drift into a mind
wandering state, where oneʼs thoughts become more in-
ternally focused, there is a concomitant reduction in the
degree of sensory processing in both the visual and audi-
tory domains (Kam et al., 2011)—effects directly analo-
gous to what we observed in our P1 data. Accordingly, if
“self” cues triggered a greater degree of internal reflection
relative to “other” cues, then that could explain our P1
results from Experiment 2. Critically, however, mind wan-
dering is also associated with decreased P300 responses
to external stimuli (e.g., Smallwood, Beach, Schooler, &
Handy, 2008), the opposite P300 pattern to what we ob-
served here for “self” cues.
In closing, self-relevant information processing has been
argued to impact upon other cognitive and behavioral pro-
cesses such as recognition memory (Van den Bos et al.,
2010; Cunningham et al., 2008; Turk et al., 2008). It would
also be interesting to explore the extent to which the
identified cognitive and perceptual attention effects we
observed here might predict the magnitude of the self-
memory bias associated with object ownership (Van den
Bos et al., 2010; Cunningham et al., 2008). Specifically, is
the self-memory advantage observed in object ownership
related to the magnitude of the degree of self-relevant
information processing (as measured via the P300), the
narrowing of visual-perceptual attentional focus (as mea-
sured via the P1), or both? Given the ubiquity of object
ownership in everyday life, future studies might profitably
explore these central, self-relevant issues.
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